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Abstract This study focuses on individuals’ subjective
reasons for complying with rules for common pool resource
management. We examine the topic of individual rule
compliance, which the commons literature has addressed
only marginally, and outline recent empirical findings.
Hypotheses are derived based on rule compliance theory
and explored using data gathered in a Cuban community
sharing a solar energy system. The statistical analyses
reveal that compliance with rules for energy management is
influenced by various factors. Depending on the particular
rule, factors such as sanctioning, legitimacy, and compat-
ibility, among others, influence the frequency of individual
rule compliant behavior to differing extents.
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Introduction
In regulating use of common pool resources, rules are
regarded as an important mechanism for avoiding individ-
ual overuse and resource degradation (Ostrom, 1990;
Ostrom et al., 1994). Some of the literature on common
pool resource management contains more or less explicit
assumptions of conditions that have to be met for
individuals to comply with rules. The theoretical tradition
following Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) and
related models argue that humans are rational and egoistic
actors who will deplete a resource if no coercion of any sort
is applied, preferably by public authorities. However, there
are a vast number of studies demonstrating that local
communities worldwide have been able to establish
sustainable management systems and avoid the “tragedy”
(Baland and Platteau, 1996; Bender, 2002; Cardenas et al.,
2000; Hoffmann, 2004; Lu, 2001; McCay and Acheson,
1987; Ostrom, 1990; Trawick, 2001; Wade, 1988; White
and Runge, 1995). Local knowledge of the characteristics
of the resource and the specific conditions often found in
traditional small-scale groups (such as group homogeneity)
create favorable conditions for self-management (Agrawal,
2001a,b). Authors following this “self-management per-
spective” emphasize the importance of strong community
norms and participation or—if a certain degree of external
involvement in management policy is accepted—“coman-
agement” by local users when establishing rules (Jentof and
Kristoffersen, 1989; Nielsen, 2003; Ostrom, 1998, 2000). Be-
sides such discursive compliance mechanisms (Honneland,
1999), coercive mechanisms inducing compliance are main-
tained in the self-management perspective when rules are
monitored and violators sanctioned, although often by the
community itself and not by public authorities.
While the studies mentioned above imply assumptions
of how compliance can be achieved, other studies have
focused more explicitly on how individual compliance can
be explained psychologically. The present paper starts out
by examining theoretical and empirical findings on the
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topic of individual rule compliance. Based on the findings,
we derive hypotheses for our own research on the case of a
Cuban community managing their commons, which we test
statistically.
Determinants of Individual Rule Compliance
Models of individual rule compliance integrate factors from
economic, psychological, and sociological theories (Honneland,
1999; Nielsen, 2003; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Thibaut et al.,
1974). Economic models, such as Becker’s “General Deter-
rence Model” (1968), take an instrumental perspective that
assumes that individuals react primarily to the rewards and
costs of compliance behavior. Deterrence through high
sanctioning costs continues to be an important instrument to
enforce compliant behavior in various contexts (in traffic law
enforcement, for example). The effects of sanctioning costs
result from the perceived probability of being detected and the
severity of the expected sanctions (Diekmann, 1980; Gelau,
2001; Karstedt, 1993). The effectiveness of the one factor is
believed to be dependent on the other, as neither of them is
effective on its own. Mathematically, sanctioning costs can be
calculated as the probability of being detected multiplied by the
severity of the sanctions (Opp, 1971). Compliant behavior,
therefore, can be enforced by increased surveillance and
increased sanctioning severity. This view corresponds to the
rational-choice tradition of viewing resource management
(Hardin, 1968), which sees constraints and surveillance as the
only means for controlling individual behavior and preventing
resource degradation. This economic perspective has important
restrictions, however: overall surveillance is often not possible,
and large-scale monitoring systems are very costly. Addition-
ally, people still find ways to avoid controls and evade the
rules. Psychological and sociological theories of rule compli-
ance integrate individual and social factors: Personal morals,
social norms, and legitimacy of rules are non-instrumental de-
terminants of compliance behavior (Gezelius, 2004; Honneland,
1999; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Thibaut et al., 1974).
Rule compliance can follow a personal feeling of moral
commitment to “do the right thing.” The importance of
morals in adherence to social rules has been widely
examined (see, for example, Kerr et al., 1997; Kohlberg,
1976). A study of rule compliance in fisheries (Sutinen et al.,
1990) showed that despite the possibility of high illegal
gains, fishermen chose to show compliant behavior because
they wanted to do the right thing. Other studies (such as
Pfeiffer and Gelau, 2002) identified a “general norm
orientation”—a general normative disposition to follow
rules—that had a positive effect on compliance with traffic
rules.
The behavior of others also influences individual
behavior. Social norms, or notions of what most people
perceive as adequate in a certain situation, exert a kind of a
social pressure, because ignoring such norms could be
sanctioned by others (Reno et al., 1993). Several studies of
rule compliance in common pool resource systems have
revealed that individuals adjust their behavior to the
behavior of their social group (Eggert and Ellegard, 2003;
Mosler and Brucks, 2003; Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003).
The perception of the legitimacy of rules is a further factor
influencing compliance. The topic of legitimacy has been
addressed by justice researchers analyzing the role of
distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional
justice in organizational settings (Colquitt et al., 2001;
Tyler, 1994; Tyler and Blader, 2000). Distributive justice
describes the fairness of the distributional effect of rules.
Some theories claim that people demand equity rules
(Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1976, 1978), meaning that
their expectation of receipt is proportional to what they
have invested. Other forms of distribution rules are equality
rules (everybody receives the same) or rules distributing
according to individual needs (Leventhal, 1976). Which
distributive rule is preferred depends on individual, con-
textual, and cultural factors (Allison, 1990; Allison et al.,
1992; Fiske, 1990; Hofstede, 1980; Mannix et al., 1995;
Van Dijk and Wilke, 1995; Van Dijk et al., 1999) People
are more likely to obey rules that have the desired
distributional effect (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001).
Procedural justice describes the fairness exercised by
the authorities imposing rules and the fairness of the rule
development process (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Many
different criteria of procedural justice have been introduced,
such as “process control” and “decision control” (Thibaut
and Walker, 1975), or “consistency”, “bias suppression”,
“accuracy of information”, “correctability”, “ethicality”,
and “representation” (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal et al.,
1980). These are attributes that describe desirable partici-
pative, democratic, transparent, and ethical elements in the
rule development process. Interactional justice (Bies and
Moag, 1986; Shapiro et al., 1994) additionally describes the
degree of interpersonal fairness, meaning the respect and
politeness shown to people by the authorities imposing
rules, and the degree of informational justice, or the
perceived transparency and adequacy of information in the
rule development process. Rule compliance has been found
to occur more often when rules are legitimate in the sense of
these forms of justice (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001).
Contextual factors must also be considered when
discussing rule compliance. Rules should be compatible
with local conditions. Only rules that do not interfere
strongly with livelihood strategies are likely to be obeyed
(Horning, 2000). Similarly, rules should be perceived as
adequate—their necessity and their protective function in
resource systems should be apparent (Nielsen, 2003).
Habits or routines can impede the adoption of new be-
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haviors, but they can also strengthen them once new
behavior is adopted (Honneland, 1999). Compliance behav-
ior must become routine; the obedience of new rules should
break old behavioral habits. Other external factors (such as
the possibility of access to markets) can have an effect on
compliance behavior if people depend on a resource for
economic outcome. Monetary incentives can lead to in-
creased non-compliance (Horning, 2000; Marquette, 1998).
These findings correspond to findings in common pool
“self-management” and “comanagement” perspectives
(Agrawal and Goyal, 2001; Ostrom, 1990) that emphasize
the importance of norms, participation, and consideration of
local conditions for well-functioning community manage-
ment. But they also show that some coercive measures
(sanctioning) are often necessary for maintaining the rules.
Table I shows factors that are considered to be determinants
of individual compliance behavior.
So far, we have mentioned several psychological
factors that have proved to have an influence on
individual rule compliance in different contexts. Most of
the determinants have also been found to be important in
resource management systems where rules for use
regulation have been applied. Most studies have used
qualitative methods to explain rule compliance, whereas
quantitative studies are still rare. Our case study includes
quantitative statistical analyses in order to yield the psy-
chological factors and evidence of the extent to which
these factors determine individual compliance with rules
for resource management.
Hypotheses
Our hypotheses focus on the factors in Table I that are marked
with an (×) and on additional assumptions concerning these
factors for further explanations. Accordingly, our hypotheses
were the following:
I. Individual compliance with a rule is influenced by
a) sanctioning costs
b) general norm orientation
c) social norms
d) distributive justice
e) procedural justice
f) interactional justice (interpersonal and
informational justice)
g) compatibility
h) adequacy
II. For an extended explanation, we assume that:
i) the individual’s perception of sanctioning costs is
based on the perceived possibility of non-compliant
behavior being detected and the severity of the
expected sanctions
j) perceived compatibility depends on household
characteristics (such as daily routines)
k) perceived adequacy of rules depends on the
perceived state of the resource.
Research Setting and Methods
Description of the Community and the Solar
Energy System
The common pool resource in this case study is shared solar
energy provided by a photovoltaic (PV) system; these sys-
tems are also called also multiuser systems (MUS). MUS can
provide energy to 200–400 households (Mitjá et al., 2003).
Although solar energy is a renewable and unlimited resource,
the system size (number and quality of the PV panels) and
storing capacity (number and quality of batteries) determine
the amount of electricity produced and stored and set limits
on consumption. This means that the users cannot consume
as much power as they want as they have to consider the
needs of other users. Additionally, inverters (technical
devices converting AC to DC current for the use of house-
hold appliances) limit the amount of energy that can be
demanded at any particular time. General overuse leads to
the depletion of the stored energy, and too high simultaneous
energy demand leads to system failures (inverter disconnec-
tions), leaving all the users without electricity. Rules for
energy management, therefore, are crucial for communities
using shared solar energy systems. As individual misbehav-
ior has consequences for the whole community, individual
compliance with rules for use regulation is important.
The Cuban community investigated, the village of Santa
Maria del Loreto (650 m above sea level), is located 20 km
from the municipal city of Songo, La Maya district, and
Table I Determinants of Individual Rule Compliance (Factors
Marked with “×” Are Included in the Following Analysis)
Economic factor Sanctioning costs (×)
Personal factors Personal morals
General norm orientation (×)
Social norms Social norm (×)
Legitimacy Distributive justice (×)
Procedural justice (×)
Interactional justice (×)
(Interpersonal and informational justice)
Contextual factors Compatibility (×)
Adequacy (×)
Routines
External factors
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50 km from the provincial capital Santiago de Cuba. The
village has 156 residents living in 42 family households
(Díaz López et al., 2002). The main source of income is
agriculture, as most of the residents work on coffee and
flower plantations. Because everything is state owned, the
workers receive only a minimal wage and cannot trade
these agricultural products privately. For personal needs,
they breed stock and cultivate vegetables and other crops,
which—if there is a surplus—they trade within the village
and in neighboring communities. Not everybody has this
additional source of income, so that despite equal state
wages, actual income is heterogeneous. The community has
its own primary school, a small shop, a plant for coffee
processing, and a community hall. A doctor responsible for
the residents of Santa Maria and the neighboring villages
stays in Santa Maria during the week.
For 15 years prior to the installation of the MUS, the
village received electricity from a diesel plant that provided
energy for two to three hours per day. In 1997 the plant was
replaced by a MUS with a maximum output of 10 and 6 kW
of inverter power (3 inverters of 2 kW) (Díaz López et al.,
2000; Ramos et al., 1998). The system was donated by two
nongovernmental organizations, Sol para Cuba (Austria)
and Cubasolar (Cuba), and the coordinating institution was
Centro de Investigaciones de Energía Solar (CIES),
Santiago de Cuba. The community was chosen for this
electrification project because it met important geographical
and social conditions for installing MUS: the houses are
situated close together as required by an electricity main
system, and the social intimacy and transparency of the
community was regarded as advantageous for the sharing of
an energy supply system. A meeting was held to inform the
community about the project and about solar energy. The
advantages of the system over the existing diesel generator
were explained, and the community was invited to ask
questions. The community then decided in favor of the
installation and helped with the construction work. The
system provides electricity to 42 households of Santa Maria
and seven households of the neighboring village, El
Triunfo. Maintenance and continuous monitoring is per-
formed by CIES. The village mayor of Santa Maria was
employed for smaller maintenance tasks and for monitoring
the system and energy consumption of the residents. He
was chosen for these tasks because he has an educational
background as technician and had been the leader of the
village for several years. He receives a small wage from the
National Electricity Company and from the community.
The users pay 0.2 Cuban pesos (27 pesos = US$ 1) per kW
as a contribution towards maintenance costs and towards
the wages for the mayor.
Electricity is used for private and public lighting,
electrical appliances in the households, and public facilities.
When the MUS was installed, all households received three
energy-saving light bulbs (15 W), two fluorescent lamps
(20 W), and a small radio (8 W). Energy consumption rose
over time, as people bought new appliances, such as
televisions, mixers, electric rice cookers, and even refriger-
ators. Parallel to this, due to technical problems in the years
2001–2003, three originally installed inverters of 2 kW each
had to be replaced with one inverter of only 4 kW.
Additionally, people gradually replaced energy-saving light
bulbs and the fluorescent bulbs with normal light bulbs,
because energy-saving bulbs are rarely sold in the markets
and fluorescent bulbs are expensive. These circumstances—
reduced inverter power and rising energy consumption—led
to system failures due to simultaneous consumption peaks.
The introduction of use rules became necessary.
Rules for Energy Management
With growing energy consumption, the risk of general
overconsumption and particularly of simultaneous con-
sumption peaks has increased over the years. Up to now
enough energy could be stored thanks to a big battery bank.
The reduced inverter power, however, has led to moments
of short energy supply with system disconnections caused
by high simultaneous energy demand. In order to avoid
high demand peaks, but also to reduce energy consumption
generally, four energy use rules, in stages, were introduced
(Jenny et al., 2004):
1. No use of irons and washing machines
2. No use of light bulbs of 40 W or more
3. Appliances with high energy consumption (such as
mixers, hair dryers, rice cookers, etc.) should only be
used during the day (preferably midday) and not in the
evenings
4. Refrigerators have to be disconnected from 6 p.m.–
10 p.m.
The first rule was introduced when the system was
installed. CIES Calculations confirmed that the system could
not provide sufficient energy to allow individual use of irons
and washing machines. Also, these appliances have high start
up currents, that is, high instantaneous power, which requires
relatively high inverter power. Therefore CIES suggested
prohibiting the use of such appliances and the villagers were
strongly advised to adopt the rule, which they did. Although at
the beginning the community only used energy-saving light
bulbs, a lack of supply in the market gradually led to
replacement with normal light bulbs. After the reduction of
inverter power, the use of normal light bulbs of up to 100 W
led to many system disconnections due to high instantaneous
power. A donation of energy-saving bulbs by the local
government and the introduction of the second rule by the
villagers improved the situation. Light bulbs and fluorescent
bulbs of 40 W or more have been prohibited for everybody.
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The third and fourth rules were introduced after people
began buying the appliances listed. Again, high simulta-
neous consumption peaks caused system failures, so it was
agreed that owners of these appliances should use them
only during the day, when general consumption is low.
Apart from the strong advice from CIES to introduce the
first rule, the village of Santa Maria has independently
developed rules for managing energy distribution. The
village mayor became the most important person in the
process of introducing and enforcing new rules: He
developed great experience over the years and he normally
proposes and communicates new rules. If he thinks a new
rule is necessary that affects the whole community (such as
rule 2), he arranges a community meeting to inform
everybody about the necessity of a new rule and invites
everybody to discuss the proposition. If only some house-
holds have to know a rule (such as rules 3 and 4), because
they possess appliances requiring restrictions, the village
mayor personally advises them. The mayor also monitors
adherence to the rules and identifies rule breakers by
observing households, visiting door-to-door and, occasion-
ally, with the help of other inhabitants who think they know
who the rule breaker is. Rule breakers are warned, and if
they repeatedly fail to obey the rules, they are sanctioned
by having their electricity supply cut off for several days.
Such repeated rule breaking, however, has only occurred
few times up to now. Rule breaking sooner or later becomes
publicly known and talked about in the community. Since
rule compliance is a crucial issue in the village, it is a
frequent subject of conversation and gossip. However, the
village mayor is officially in charge of the decision-making
where energy related issues are concerned.
Methods
In January 2004, we conducted face-to-face interviews with
key persons in the community and representative family
members of all households of Santa Maria and El Triunfo
that are provided with electricity by the MUS. The
interviews were based on a questionnaire tapping informa-
tion about household characteristics, perceptions of system
performance, and individual compliance behavior. Taking
into consideration that cultural background influences
response behavior, the questionnaires were tested carefully
by local social scientists. Also, locals conducted the
interviews in order to elicit reliable data. The interview
participants were invited to answer and discuss the
questions spontaneously. The answers were then rated on
a scale, which the participants had to confirm. Additionally,
all comments made by the interview participants were
recorded. This procedure allowed the generation of quali-
tative and quantitative data. Table II shows the data
collected from all households. All variables are listed as
well as item examples.
The interview first gathered information on household
characteristics, such as the number of people, electrical
appliances in use, and daily routines and habits. This gave
us an idea of how people live and work and how they spend
their free time. Participants were then asked about their
perception of the state of the resource, that is, how much
energy was available at the time and how often they
experienced system failures. This information was rated on
scales. The participants were then presented with the
existing rules for energy management and asked if they
were aware of these rules. If this was the case, the interview
continued with questions about the factors determining rule
compliance. Each rule was evaluated with items measuring
perceptions of the sanctioning system, the households’
general norm orientation, the perceived social norm, the
legitimacy (distributive, procedural, interactional justice),
compatibility, and adequacy of the rules. For every rule, the
overall sanctioning costs, the probability of being detected,
and the severity of sanctions had to be rated on scales. To
measure the family’s general norm orientation, participants
were asked if their family considered rules as necessary for
community life. As a constant trait, this led to one single
value as opposed to separate values for each rule.
Participants were also asked about their perception of the
strength of a social norm of obedience to each of the rules:
this was measured by asking how they perceived the
compliance behavior of the other community members.
The issue of legitimacy included variables about the
distributive effect of the rules, participation in the rule
development process (procedural justice), and the transpar-
ency of the rule development process (informational
justice). Distributive justice was rated in general, that is,
the distributive effect (how energy is distributed in the
community) of the whole rule system had to be judged
(single value). The interviewees were asked if participation
was possible and if they obtained transparent and adequate
information. Questions about the treatment of people
(interpersonal justice) by the village authority (mayor)
who enforces the rules were excluded for political reasons.
Questions about contextual factors included variables
measuring the perceived degree of compatibility of each
rule with daily life. Further, we wanted to find out what
participants thought about, whether the rules were adequate
for protecting the resource. Information about the actual
compliance behavior of each household was obtained from
the household members themselves and from the village
mayor who monitors energy use by the community and
knows about the individual rule compliance of all house-
holds. Regression analyses were then carried out, which
provided information as to how much variance of rule
compliant behavior can be explained. This reveals which
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variables, and to what extent, determine individual differ-
ences in the frequency of rule compliant behavior.
Additionally, perceptions of the state of the commons were
correlated with the perceived adequacy of the rules. The
assumption is that a rule is perceived as more adequate the
fewer problems there are with the solar energy system (such
as system failures). Correlations were also calculated to
compare households having different characteristics and
perceptions of rule compatibility. We assume that the
perceived compatibility of a rule with everyday life is
influenced by various household characteristics (such as the
demographic composition of the family and its daily routines).
Results
Knowledge and Compliance
Before addressing the hypotheses, let us look at the level of
knowledge of the rules and the actual frequency of rule
compliance for each rule. All households are affected by the
first (prohibition of irons and washing machines) and
second rule (prohibition of light bulbs of more than
40 W). And indeed, all households except one are aware
of the first rule. Two households claimed that they did not
know about the second rule. Sixteen households possess
high-energy appliances and should therefore know about
the third rule (use of appliances with high energy
consumption only during the day). This is the case, as all
of these households claimed to be aware of this rule.
Interestingly, most of the other households also know this
rule, even though it does not apply to them. The fourth rule
(disconnection of refrigerators during the evening) is of
relevance for one private household and the doctor’s house
only, as they are the only ones with a refrigerator. Both of
these parties know the rule, and, again, most of the other
residents have also heard about the rule. During the period
that the interviews were conducted, people followed the
rules. To obtain information on average rule compliance
behavior, we asked about their behavior over the previous
12 months. Table III shows the frequency of compliance
with each rule.
Table II Data Collected from All Households of Santa Maria; Variables and Item Examples
Variable Item (example)
1. Household
characteristics
Socio-demography Number of members, gender, occupation of each member
Load data Number, type, and power of each appliance
Habits and activities Presence times at home, social activities
2. Perception
of the state of
the commons
System failures How often did system failures occur in the last weeks?
Available energy How much energy does the solar energy system produce at the moment?
3. Rules
for energy
management
Knowledge of each rule Do you know this rule?
4. Rule
compliance
Sanctioning costs As how hard do you consider the sanctions?
General norm orientation As how important do you consider the rules for achieving an ordered
community life in your village?
Social norms How often have the other inhabitants of your
community followed the rule in the last 12 months?
Distributive justice Do you think energy is distributed just in your community?
Procedural justice To which extent were you allowed to participate in the rule
development process?
Interactional justice
(informational justice)
To which extent did you receive transparent information about
the reasons why the rule should be introduced?
Compatibility How strongly does the rule limit you in your daily activities?
Adequacy In a how great extent do you think the rule helps to prevent system
failures and resource shortages?
Actual compliance How often have you followed the rule in the last 12 months?
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So far, everybody has obeyed the rule forbidding the use
of irons and washing machines, as the village mayor
confirmed. The second rule (prohibition of light bulbs of
more than 40 W) has been followed by 64% of the
households that claimed to be aware of the rule; 18%
reported they obeyed the rule most of the time, and 14%
followed the rule only seldom; 4% reported they have not
complied with it at any time. Sixty-eight percent of the
households affected by the third rule (use of appliances
with high energy consumption only during the day) obeyed
the rule always or most of the time, 25% have seldom
complied with the rule, and 7% have never obeyed it. The
village member and the doctor affected by the fourth rule
(disconnection of refrigerators during the evening) followed
the rule most of the time or seldom.
Factors Influencing Individual Rule Compliance
(Hypothesis I)
The hypothesis is that sanctioning costs, general norm
orientation, social norms, perceptions of legitimacy (distrib-
utive, procedural and interactional justice), and contextual
factors (compatibility, adequacy) influence rule-compliant
behavior. It can be assumed that the influence of each factor
varies depending on the rule. The statistical analysis will
reveal which factors are of importance for compliance with
each rule. Each of the four rules is analyzed separately.
Rule 1: No Use of Irons and Washing Machines
There is no variance in compliance behavior for this first
rule. So far, everyone has followed this rule. Regression
analysis cannot be calculated, because there is no variance
in individual behavior to be explained. It is interesting,
however, that this is the only rule where non-compliant
behavior does not occur. A comparison of the variables’
statistics might reveal some of the reasons (Table IV ).
Compared to the other rules, the first rule is seen on
average as less legitimate, less adequate, and more
incompatible, which would be reasons for attempts to break
it. But the interviews also show that the sanctioning costs of
breaking this rule compared to the other rules are rated
higher. Also, the social norm of obeying the rule prevails.
Rule 2: No Use of Light Bulbs of 40 W or More
Differences in compliance behavior among households for
rule 2 allow a regression analysis to be calculated. Table V
shows the model with all explanatory (independent)
variables included.
The model is able to explain 57% of the variance in
frequency of compliance with rule 2. Sanctioning costs,
distributive and informational justice, and compatibility
statistically (*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≥ 0.01) appear as significant
factors influencing individual rule compliance. Households
who perceive the rule as compatible with everyday life
more often show compliant behavior than households who
rate the rule as incompatible. Those households break the
rules more often. This variable is the strongest determinant
of rule compliance (as is indicated by the β-value). People
who perceive the development process of this rule as fair in
terms of informational justice (adequate and transparent
information) and think that energy is generally distributed
fairly in the community obeyed the rule more often. The
Table III Frequency of Com-
pliance (Percentage) with
the Rules in Santa Maria
Frequency of compliance Rule 1
(n = 48)
Rule 2
(n = 47)
Rule 3
(n = 16)
Rule 4
(n = 2)
Always 100 64 31 0
Most of the time 0 18 37 50
Seldom 0 14 25 50
Never 0 4 7 0
Table IV Mean Values of
Each Factor and Rated
for Every Rule
General norm orientation:
M = 1.8 (SD = 0.7); Distribu-
tive justice: M = 2.0 (SD = 1.5)
Min = 1, Max = 5; Coding:
1 = very high, 5 = very low;
n = 48 (rule 1), 47 (rule 2),
16 (rule 3), 2 (rule 4)
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Sanctioning costs 1.7 0.7 2.2 0.6 3.1 0.9 3 0
Social norm 2.7 1.2 3.5 0.9 3.8 0.8 3.5 0.7
Procedural justice 3.8 1.1 3.1 1.2 2.9 1.1 3.2 2.1
Informational justice 2.2 1.2 2.2 1.1 1.8 0.9 1.5 0.7
Adequacy 2.3 0.8 1.8 0.7 2.0 0.5 1.6 0.7
Incompatibility 2.7 1.2 3.5 0.9 3.8 0.8 3.5 0.7
Routine barriers – – – – 4.1 0.6 3 0
Hum Ecol (2007) 35:239–250 245
more severe the sanctioning costs are perceived, the more
rule compliance has been recorded.
Rule 3: Appliances with High Energy Consumption
Should Only be Used During the Day
There are differences in the frequency of compliance with
the third rule, too. Because of the small sample size (n =
16) regression analysis with as many as eight explanatory
variables leads to distortions, so that in a first step only
correlations and partial-correlations were calculated. A
model was then calculated only with the variables signif-
icantly related to the frequency of rule compliant behavior.
Table VI shows the regression analysis with two explana-
tory (independent) variables that were able to explain most
of the variance in rule compliance in this small sample.
This model is able to explain 64% of the variance in rule
compliance. Again, compatibility is an influential factor.
There is an even stronger association between the general
norm orientation and the frequency of rule compliant
behavior. Households with a strong norm orientation do
not violate the third rule as often as households with a
weaker norm orientation.
Rule 4: Refrigerators Have to be Disconnected
from 6 to 10 p.m.
Only one household and the doctor were affected by this rule
during our study. With only two cases, no statistical analysis
could be conducted. However, in both cases, incompatibility
seems to have caused occasional non-compliance.
Sanctioning Costs, Compatibility, and Adequacy
(Hypothesis II)
Table VII shows the results of the correlations between
sanctioning costs and sanctioning possibility × severity,
between compatibility and household characteristics, and
between adequacy and perceived state of the resource,
calculated for rules 1–3 (rule 4 has a too small sample size).
Based on existing theory, we analyzed whether individ-
ual perceptions of sanctioning costs are based on the
perceived possibility of non-compliant behavior being
detected and the severity of expected sanctions. For every
rule, the possibility of being detected and the severity of the
sanctions were rated separately. A variable constructed of
these values multiplied was compared with the perceived
sanctioning costs of the rule. Correlation with the values of
rules 1–3 show significant relations between the multiplied
value of the perceived possibility of non-compliant behav-
ior being detected and the severity of expected sanctions,
and the sanctioning costs.
Explorative correlation analysis between various house-
hold characteristics and perceived compatibility shows that
especially households with many school-age children
perceive the first rule (prohibition of irons and washing
machines) as incompatible. The second rule (prohibition of
light bulbs of more than 40 W) was rated as incompatible
especially by households with many members getting up
early in the mornings. Households with many children and
Table V Regression of the Independent Variables “Sanctioning Costs,” “General Norm Orientation,” “Social Norm,” “Distributive Justice,”
“Procedural Justice,” “Informational Justice,” “Compatibility,” and “Adequacy” on the Dependant Variable “Rule Compliance with Rule 2”
B β r sr p-value
Sanctioning costs 0.183 0.210 0.492 0.178 0.047*
General norm orientation −0.053 −0.064 0.143 −0.068 −0.775
Social norm 0.037 0.045 −0.149 0.035 0.787
Distributive justice 0.124 0.138 0.359 0.143 0.050*
Procedural justice −0.169 −0.194 0.056 −0.097 0.144
Informational justice 0.175 0.265 0.347 0.121 0.039*
Compatibility 0.437 0.443 0.437 0.397 0.000**
Adequacy −0.014 −0.088 0.023 −0.093 0.479
Constant 4.566 0.001**
R= 0.837; R2 = 0.700; adjusted R2 = 0.567; F = 5.255, p = 0.002; (df = 26); n = 47; Durbin–Watson = 1.8; r (correlation); sr (partial correlation)
*p ≤ 0.05
**p ≥ 0.01
Table VI Regression of the Independent Variables “General Norm
Orientation” and “Compatibility” on the dependant variable “Rule
Compliance with Rule 3”
B β r sr p-value
General norm
orientation
0.762 0.735 0.818 0.410 0.006**
Compatibility 0.206 0.343 0.673 0.338 0.032*
Constant 1.190 0.061
R = 0.825; R2 = 0.706; adjusted R2 = 0.640; F = 7.286; p = 0.046
(df = 12); n = 16; Durbin–Watson = 2.8; r (correlation); sr (partial
correlation)
*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≥ 0.01
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households who often receive visitors more often perceive
the third rule (high-consumption appliances must only be
used during the day) as incompatible. People who thought
that the state of the resource had been good (failures have
not occurred very often) in the 2 weeks prior to the
investigation period more often rated the first and second
rules as adequate.
Discussion
Various factors influence compliance with rules for energy
management. However, which factor, and to what extent,
depends on the particular rule.
Individual Rule Compliance in Santa Maria
So far, community residents have always followed the first
rule (prohibition of irons and washing machines). Of
course, only few residents could actually buy these
expensive appliances. Compared to the other rules, though,
this rule is perceived as less compatible with daily routines
and less legitimate. Energy consumption in general has still
not exceeded energy production so that there is normally a
surplus of stored energy. Many people favor the idea of a
public laundry room and would like to loosen the rule so
that some villagers could buy the appliances and share them
with their neighbors. However, use rules would have to be
introduced. Washing machines and irons are highly desir-
able because laundering work clothes and school uniforms
by hand is hard work, which might be the reason families
with many school-age children perceive this rule as
especially limiting (hypothesis II). Additionally, the fact
that rule was not introduced by the community but by the
technicians that installed the MUS might cause the
perception of low legitimacy. Still, people have obeyed
this rule, and the analyses show that the social norm to
follow the rule is perceived as strong and the sanctioning
costs of breaking the rule are perceived as high. In fact, it is
perceived as the “strictest” rule, and the opinion prevails
that rule breaking would be detected immediately and
sanctioned severely. It is true that the social intimacy of the
village would probably make it difficult to hide irons and
washing machines.
Regression analysis explaining compliance with rule 2
(no use of light bulbs of 40 W or more) has shown that
compatibility, informational fairness, distributive justice,
and sanctioning costs explained 57% of the variance in
frequency of compliance. The prohibition of use of normal
light bulbs (60–100 W) has been a serious limitation for
many inhabitants, as energy-saving bulbs are hardly
available, and fluorescent bulbs are more expensive. A
donation of energy-saving light bulbs from the local
government improved the situation, but some households
still have to get along with fewer lamps than before. This
incompatibility is apparently the strongest reason for
breaking the rule. Further analysis (hypothesis II) showed
that especially households with members getting up early in
the mornings when it is still dark have broken the rule more
often. Households who generally think that rule 2 leads to
unjust energy distribution break it more often. The second
rule seems particularly to limit those people who, besides
lamps, do not possess other appliances. It is not surprising
that poorer people do not like to follow this limiting rule.
However, when the rule was introduced, the problem was
discussed intensively and the mayor explained why the use
of normal light bulbs is problematic, and told residents that
non-compliance would lead to sanctions. This raised
people’s awareness and provided further—although not as
strong—reasons for complying with this rule.
General norm orientation and compatibility significantly
explain the variance (64%) in compliance with the third
rule (high-consuming appliances should only be used
during the day). Due to the small sample size, only
tentative conclusions can be drawn about these relation-
ships, but the results can be seen as tendencies. The third
rule has existed for many years and is well established.
Perceived incompatibility, however, can still lead to non-
compliant behavior. As further analysis especially shows
(hypothesis II), households with many children and visitors
Table VII Correlations Be-
tween Sanctioning Costs
and Sanctioning Possibility ×
Severity, Between Compatibil-
ity and Household Character-
istics, and Between Adequacy
and Perceived State of the
Resource, Calculated for
Rules 1–3
*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≥ 0.01
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4
Sanctioning costs
Possibility × severity 0.45* 0.61** 0.39* –
Compatibility
Household characteristics
Number of children −0.38* – −0.42* –
Time getting up – −0.36* – –
Frequency of visitors – – −0.50* –
Adequacy
State of the resource 0.59* 0.32* 0.09 –
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especially rated incompatibility higher than other house-
holds. Visitors from neighboring communities often come
in the evenings, and this is also the time when school
children spend most of their time at home. It might be
incompatible that mixers (to prepare fruit juices) or rice
cookers (to prepare dinner) cannot be used at this time.
There is an even stronger association between a family’s
general norm orientation and compliance behavior. Com-
ments by neighbors and the village mayor confirm that
there are households who sometimes just “do not want to”
follow rules. Those who have repeatedly broken the rule are
described as having a certain tendency to non-conforming
behavior. It is possible that people who do not care as much
about rules as others are more likely to break such a well-
established as the third one.
The two households affected by the fourth rule (refrig-
erators have to be disconnected from 6 to 10 p.m.)
mentioned incompatibility making compliance difficult
from time to time. They have sometimes forgotten to ask
others to disconnect their refrigerators when they were not
at home, and the doctor’s unpredictable patient visits in the
evenings make advance planning difficult.
General Conclusions
Comparing our results with other empirical findings,
differences as well as parallels can be found. Many other
empirical studies have also analyzed the importance of
sanctions to enforce compliance of rules in common pool
resource management. The probability of being detected
and the severity of sanctioning as important components of
sanctioning systems (Pfeiffer and Gelau, 2002) can be
confirmed by our study (hypothesis II). Sanctioning,
however, is not commonly perceived as the only factor to
enforce rule compliance. In Santa Maria, sanctioning seems
to enforce the first rule especially, because the probability
of being detected is very high.
The only kind of (internal) pressure of importance for
rule compliance was general norm orientation. Social
norms, that is, the behavior of others, statistically did not
have any influence. Non-compliance by others does not
seem to be an incentive to do the same; in general there is
disapproval of non-compliance. As rule compliance gener-
ally is quite high, the social norm of compliance might
prevail. A low general norm orientation, however, was a
strong determinant of non-compliance with the third rule.
Pfeiffer and Gelau (2002) demonstrated in their studies that
the general norm orientation was of importance when
conscious decisions had to be made. The general norm
orientation was not of relevance in automatic or uncon-
scious decisions (such as driving through a red light at an
intersection). The third rule in Santa Maria has existed for a
long time, so that people have had time to think about it.
Non-compliant behavior as conscious behavior can there-
fore be partly explained through a low norm orientation.
The influence of legitimacy has been analyzed in several
experimental and field studies in different areas: decisions
by authorities in formal situations (such as jurisdiction) are
more likely to be accepted if the persons involved perceive
procedural and interactional justice (Colquitt, 2001, Tyler,
1994). Other studies show that procedural and interactional
justice have a positive effect on worker commitment and
organizational citizenship behavior among employees
(Thompson and Heron, 2005; Williams et al., 2002). In
common pool resource management these aspects have
been described as comanagement. Participation and trans-
parency of information favored compliance with rules.
Statistically, in Santa Maria less procedural justice (partic-
ipation) than informational justice (transparent and ade-
quate information) was perceived for all rules (see
Table IV). Many of the residents in fact emphasized that
whereas they want to be well-informed about the rules, it
was not of such great importance to them to participate
actively in the development of a new rule. Consequently,
informational justice was more likely to influence rule
compliance if perceived as insufficient. The low level of
active participation might be explained as follows: The
village mayor has an official order to maintain the MUS
and to monitor energy consumption. The residents of Santa
Maria—and Cuban society in general—respect such a
status. Additionally, the mayor has been the village leader
for a long time and knows the community very well. He has
a lot of experience in understanding the dynamics of the
MUS and in formulating adequate rules that are compatible
with the demands of the community. Although it was not
possible to explore the issue of interpersonal justice in a
more open way, personal experience and informal con-
versations with the community members showed that the
villagers have great confidence in the mayor’s skill to
develop adequate rules. Transparent information (e.g.,
through village meetings) and confidence in the village
mayor therefore seem to be more important to the
community members than active participation.
The inhabitants of Santa Maria expressed different
opinions where distributive justice is concerned. Today,
energy is allocated based on the quantity and type of
appliances that people possess (which depends on their
income). Most people, however, would prefer equal
distribution or distribution according to individual needs.
Because many share appliances with their neighbors, so far
there have been no severe conflicts because of unequal
energy distribution.
Contextual factors, such as compatibility and adequacy,
have been shown to be important in studies of forest
management (Horning, 2000; Marquette, 1998) and fisher-
ies management (Honneland, 1999; Nielsen, 2003). These
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have been important in these “real-world” studies because
behavior in resource systems is often related to livelihood
strategies, whereas contextual factors in Santa Maria are
related to the comfort of everyday life.
Broader Perspectives
The theoretical background of our analyses is drawn from
the findings of different theories and studies in different
cultures. It is fair to assume that the factors underlying this
study are of importance in the case of this Cuban community
as well. However, it remains unclear if there are more
specific values shaping compliance behavior in different
societies. Only further studies can answer the question of
whether there are factors explaining rule compliance not
addressed in recent research.
Acknowledgments Our research in Cuba was supported by José
Raúl Díaz López (Departamento Física Aplicada, Universidad de
Oriente) and Rubén Ramos Heredia from CIES (Centro de Inves-
tigación de Energía Solar) in Santiago de Cuba. We are particularly
grateful for their suggestions and comments as well as their logistical
support. Finally, we express our gratitude to all the people of Santa
Maria del Loreto and El Triunfo who made it possible to conduct our
project.
References
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In Berkowitz, L.
(ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Academic,
New York, pp. 267–299.
Agrawal, A. (2001a). Common Property Institutions and Sustainable
Governance of Resources.World Development 29(10): 1649–1672.
Agrawal, A. (2001b). Common resources and institutional sustain-
ability. In Ostrom, E., Diez, T., Dolsak, N., Stern, P. C., Stonich
S., and Weber, E. U. (eds.), The Drama of the Commons,
National Academy Press, Washington, District of Columbia.
Agrawal, A., and Goyal, S. (2001). Group Size and Collective Action.
Third-Party Monitoring in Common-Pool Resources. Compara-
tive Political Studies 34(1): 63–93.
Allison, S. T. (1990). Social Decision Heuristics in the Use of Shared
Resources. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 3: 195–204.
Allison, S. T., McQueen, L. R., and Schaerfl, L. M. (1992). Social
Decision Making Processes and the Equal Partitionment of
Shared Resources. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
28: 23–42.
Baland, J.-M., and Platteau, J.-P. (1996). Halting Degradation of
Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.
Journal of Political Economy 72(2): 169–217.
Bender, A. (2002). “Tragödie des Fischfangs” in Tonga? Die
Bedeutung kultureller Institutionen bei der Gemeingutnutzung.
Umweltpsychologie 6(1): 26–41.
Bies, R. J., and Moag, J. F. (1986). Interactional justice: Communi-
cation criteria of fairness. In Lewicki, B. H., Sheppard, B. H., and
Bazerman, M. H. (eds.), Research on Negotiations in Organ-
izations (Vol. 1), JAI Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, pp. 43–55.
Cardenas, J. C., Stranlund, J., and Willis, C. (2000). Local
Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding Out. World
Development 28(10): 1719–1733.
Colquitt, J. A. (2001). On the Dimensionality of Organizational
Justice: A Construct Validation of a Measure. Journal of Applied
Psychology 86(3): 386–400.
Colquitt, J. A., Conlon, D. E., Wesson, M. J., Porter, C., and Yee Ng,
K. (2001). Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-analytic Review of
25 Years of Organizational Justice Research. Journal of Applied
Psychology 86(3): 425–445.
Díaz López, J. R., Camejo Cuán, J. E., Batista Cruz, I., Ramos
Heredia, R., Hernandez Perez, R, Cisnero, I., and Borges, A.
(2000). Two Year Experience in the Operation of the First
Community Photovoltaic System in Cuba. Renewable & Sus-
tainable Energy Review: 105–110.
Díaz López, J. R., Alvarez, J. J., and Mosler, H-J. (2002). Diferencias
en estado de salud y demografia en asentamientos rurales con
diferentes tipos de suministro eléctrico. VI Congreso Iberico e
VI Congreso Ibero-americano de Energia solar, Vilamoura,
Portugal.
Diekmann, A. (1980). Die Befolgung von Gesetzen. Empirische
Untersuchungen zu einer rechtssoziologischen, Theorie, Duncker
and Humblot, Berlin.
Eggert, H., and Ellegard, A. (2003). Compliance and fisher influence
in Swedish commercial fisheries regulation—A case for coman-
agement? Retrieved May 9, 2003, from www.beijer.kva.se/
conference2003/Eggert_Ellegard.pdf.
Fiske, A. P. (1990). Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary
Forms of Human Relation, Free Press, New York.
Gelau, C. (2001). Die Wirksamkeit polizeilicher Überwachung im
Strassenverkehr aus verhaltenswissenschaflticher Sicht. DIE
POLIZEI 3: 68–71.
Gezelius, S. S. (2004). Food, Money, and Morals: Compliance Among
Natural Resource Harvesters. Human Ecology 32(5): 615–634.
Hardin, G. R. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162:
1243–1248.
Hoffmann, I. (2004). Access to Land and Water in the Zamfara
Reserve. A Case Study for the Management of Common
Property Resources in Pastoral Areas of West Africa. Human
Ecology 23(1): 77–105.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s Consequences, Sage Beverly Hills,
California.
Honneland, G. (1999). A Model of Compliance in Fisheries:
Theoretical Foundations and Practical Application. Ocean and
Coastal Management 42: 699–716.
Horning, N. R. (2000). Explaining compliance with rules governing
common-pool forest resource use and conservation: Dynamics in
Bara Country, Southwestern Madagascar. Retrieved May 9, 2003,
from www.dlc.dllib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/05/69/dlc-
000005696-00/horningn052300.pdf.
Jenny, A., Mosler, H.-J., and Díaz, J. R. (2004). Towards Under-
standing Consumption in Multi-User Solar Energy Systems: The
Cases of Villages in Argentina and Cuba. Progress in Photo-
voltaics: Research and Applications 12: 559–568.
Jentof, S., and Kristoffersen, T. I. (1989). Fisheries Comanagement: The
Case of the Lofton Fishery. Human Organization 48(4): 355–365.
Karstedt, S. (1993). Normbindung und Sanktionsdrohung. Eine
Untersuchung zur Wirksamkeit von Gesetzen am Beispiel der
Alkoholdelinquenz im Strassenverkehr, Lang, Frankfurt a.m.
Kerr, N., Garst, J., Lewandowski, D. A., and Harris, S. E. (1997). That
Still, Small Voice: Commitment to Cooperate as an Internalized
Versus a Social Norm. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 23(12): 1300–1311.
Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization. In Likona, T.
(ed.), Moral Development and Behavior, Holt, Rinehart, &
Winston, New York, pp. 31–53.
Hum Ecol (2007) 35:239–250 249
Leventhal, G. S. (1976). The distribution of rewards and resources in
groups and organizations. In Berkowitz, L. and Walster, W.
(eds.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 9),
Academic, New York, pp. 91–131.
Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory?
New approaches to the study of fairness in social relationships. In
Gergen, K., Greenberg, M., and Willis, R. (eds.), Social
Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research, Plenum, New
York, pp. 27–55.
Leventhal, G. S., Karuza, J., and Fry, W. R. (1980). Beyond fairness:
A theory of allocation preferences. In Mikula, G. (ed.), Justice
and Social Interaction, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg New York,
pp. 167–218.
Lu, F. E. (2001). The Common Property Regime of the Huaorani
Indians of Ecuador: Implications and Challenges to Conserva-
tion. Human Ecology 29(4): 425–447.
Mannix, E. A., Neale, M. A., and Northcraft, G. B. (1995). Equity,
Equality, or Need? The Effects of Organizational Culture on the
Allocation of Benefits and Burdens. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes 63(3): 276–286.
Marquette, C. (1998). Land Use Patterns Among Small Farmer
Settings in the Northeastern Ecuadorian Amazon. Human
Ecology 26(4): 573–598.
McCay, B., and Acheson, J. (1987). The Culture and Ecology of
Communal Resources, University of Arizona Press, Tucson.
Mitjá, A., Torra, C., Satué, D., Peters, C., Vallvé, X., and Vosseler, I.
(2003). MSG—The Sustainable Alternative for Rural Electrifi-
cation, Barcelona: Internal Report, Institute Catalá d’Energia
ICAEN.
Mosler, H.-J., and Brucks, W. (2003). Integrating Resource Dilemma
Findings in A General Dynamic Model of Cooperative Behavior.
European Journal of Social Psychology 33: 119–1133.
Nielsen, J. R. (2003). An Analytic Framework for Studying:
Compliance and Legitimacy in Fisheries Management. Marine
Policy 27(5): 425–432.
Nielsen, J. R., and Mathiesen, C. (2003). Important Factors Influenc-
ing Rule Compliance in Fisheries—Lessons from Denmark.
Marine Policy 27(5): 409–416.
Opp, K.-D. (1971). Einige Bedingungen für die Befolgung von
Gesetzen. Kriminologisches Journal 3(3): 1–25.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons—The Evolution of
Institutions for Collective Action, University Press, Cambridge.
Ostrom, E. (1998). A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of
Collective Action. American Political Science Review 92(1): 1–22.
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective Action and the Evolution of Social
Norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 137–158.
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., and Walker, J. (1994). Rules, Games, and
Common Pool Resources, University of Michigan Press, Ann
Arbor.
Pfeiffer, M., and Gelau, C. (2002). Determinanten regelkonformen
Verhaltens am Beispiel des Strassenverkehrs: Variablen der
Norminternalisierung im Zusammenwirken mit Effekten polizei-
licher Überwachungstätigkeit. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie
und Sozialpsychologie 54(4): 694–714.
Ramos, R., Batista, I., Hernández, R., Camejo, J. E., Moreiro, J., and
Márquez, S. C. (1998). Design, Installation and Operation of the
First Central Photovoltaic Developed in Cuba. Paper presented
at the 2nd World Conference and Exhibition on Photovoltaic
Solar Energy Conversion, Wien, Austria.
Reno, R. R., Cialdani, R. B., and Kallgren, C. A. (1993). The
Transsituational Influence of Social Norms. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 64: 104–112.
Shapiro, D. L., Buttner, E. H., and Barry, B. (1994). Explanations:
What Factors Enhance Their Perceived Adequacy? Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes 58: 346–368.
Sutinen, J. G., and Kuperan, K. (1999). A Socioeconomic Theory of
Regulatory Compliance. International Journal of Social Eco-
nomics 29(1–3): 174–193.
Sutinen, J. G., Rieser, A., and Gauvin, J. (1990). Measuring and
Explaining Noncompliance in Federally Managed Fisheries.
Ocean Development and International Law 21: 335–372.
Thibaut, J., and Walker, L. (1975). Procedural Justice: A Psycholog-
ical Analysis, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey.
Thibaut, J., Friedland, N., and Walker, L. (1974). Compliance with
Rules: Some Social Determinants. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 30(6): 792–801.
Thompson, M., and Heron, P. (2005). The Difference a Manager Can
Make: Organizational Justice and Knowledge Worker Commit-
ment. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 16
(3): 383–404.
Trawick, P. B. (2001). Successfully Governing the Commons:
Principles of Social Organization in an Andean Irrigation System.
Human Ecology 29(1): 1–25.
Tyler, T. R. (1994). Psychological Models of the Justice Motive:
Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 97(5): 850–863.
Tyler, T. R., and Blader, S. L. (2000). Cooperation in Groups:
Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Behavioral Engagement,
Braun-Brunfield, Ann Arbor.
Van Dijk, E., and Wilke, H. (1995). Coordination Rules in
Asymmetric Social Dilemmas: A Comparison Between Public
Good Dilemmas and Resource Dilemmas. Journal of Experi-
mental Social Psychology 31: 1–27.
Van Dijk, E., Wilke, H., Wilke, M., and Metman, L. (1999). What
Information Do We Use in Social Dilemmas? Environmental
Uncertainty and the Employment of Coordination Rules. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology 35(2): 109–135.
Wade, R. (1988). Village Republics: Economic Conditions for
Collective Action in South India, ICA Press, San Francisco,
California.
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., and Walster, G. W. (1976). New directions
in equity research. In Walster, E. (ed.), Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology (Vol. 9), Academic, New York, pp. 1–42.
Walster, E., Walster, G. W., and Berscheid, E. (1978). Equity: Theory
and Research, Allyn and Bacon, Boston.
White, T. A., and Runge, C. F. (1995). The Emergence and Evolution
of Collective Action: Lessons from Watershed Management in
Haiti. World Development 23(10): 1638–1698.
Williams, S., Pitre, R., and Zainuba, M. (2002). Justice and
Organizational Citizenship Behavior Intentions; Fair Rewards
Versus Fair Treatment. The Journal of Social Psychology 142(1):
33–44.
250 Hum Ecol (2007) 35:239–250
